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PROMOTING HEALTH WITH SPORTS:




Medical researchers are sounding the alarm that our society’s shift to
sedentary jobs is triggering an epidemic of chronic diseases, such as type 2
diabetes.  This Article brings that modern medical research to a tax debate
and hopes to help revolutionize the sports world.  This Article’s proposal
seeks to shift our current excessive emphasis on youth, college, and elite
sports to an emphasis on participation by all.  Currently, the tax exemption
rules vigorously promote youth and college sports but generally deny most-
favored tax status to nonprofits promoting nonelite adult sports.  These
rules are based on doctrines linking sports with education, which devel-
oped in a bygone era when sports were for students and the idle rich, and
most adults got plenty of physical activity at work.  As recently as 1960,
approximately fifty percent of all jobs required at least moderate physical
activity.  By 2006, that figure had plummeted to twenty percent, and the
average U.S. male age forty to fifty was thirty-two pounds heavier than his
counterpart in 1960.  Over this same time span, there has been a dramatic
increase in chronic diseases associated with inactivity.  Scientists say that
greater physical activity and improved diet are the ways to fight this epi-
demic.  This Article makes the case for granting most-favored tax status to
organizations that promote nonelite adult athletics and do not charge high
fees that would exclude a significant portion of the community.
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“The encouragement to active participation in athletic exercise [such
as tennis] and the consequent development of a strong, healthy, and
physically alert population cannot but contribute in the national
interest.”1
“[W]ith the possible exception of diet modification, we know of no
single intervention with greater promise than physical exercise to re-
duce the risk of virtually all chronic diseases simultaneously.”2
“[I]t is unlikely that there will be a return to occupations that demand
moderate levels of physical activity . . . [so it is important to promote]
physically active lifestyles outside of the work day.”3
1. U.S. Lawn Tennis Ass’n v. Comm’r, 47 B.T.A.M. (P.H.) ¶ 42,457 (1942), available
at 1942 WL 9367.
2. Frank W. Booth et al., Waging War on Modern Chronic Diseases: Primary Preven-
tion Through Exercise Biology, 88 J. APPL. PHYSIOL. 774, 778 (2000), available at http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10658050.
3. Timothy S. Church et al., Trends over 5 Decades in U.S. Occupation-Related Physi-
cal Activity and Their Associations with Obesity, 6 PLOS ONE 2 (2011), available at jour-
nals.plosone.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0019657.
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U.S. tax policy encourages all youth and college sports, includinghead-banging, collision sports. It also encourages a strangemix of dangerous adult sports organizations that fit into a few
narrow categories. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
the courts have granted most-favored tax status to nonprofits promoting
daredevil motorcycle stunts, drag racing for amateurs using unmodified
cars, and elite college football bowl games.4 In contrast, it has denied
most-favored tax status to nonprofits promoting nonelite soccer, baseball,
volleyball, and other sports for senior citizens and other adults.5 These
disturbing results stem from a tendency to analyze whether sports are
educational and ignore whether sports promote health.6
This Article asserts that courts and the IRS should recognize that non-
profits promoting nonelite adult sports and meeting certain conditions
should qualify for Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) (IRC
§ 501(c)(3)) status because they promote health. The courts and the IRS
have consistently ignored or downplayed health arguments in this area.7
Although Congress and a commentator have expressed frustration over
the IRS’s approach generally, neither have considered the impact that a
fair appreciation of the health benefits of sports would have.8 This Article
predicts that a new focus on health could generate surprising, but appro-
priate, results. It would promote nonprofit adult sports that provide sub-
stantial public benefits. Also, it might withhold tax advantages from some
4. Evel Knievel Days 2011 IRS Form 990-EZ, page 1, line J (reporting that the organ-
ization is an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization), available at www.guidestar.org/organizations/
46-0511839/evel-knievel-week.aspx; see also Kevin Barry & Marcy Karin, Law Clinics and
Lobbying Restrictions, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 985, 1021 n.175 (2013) (describing the proce-
dure for locating the IRS Form 990 for an organization at www.guidestar.org); Lions Asso-
ciated Drag Strip v. United States, No. 63-45-WM, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9608, at *12–13,
15, (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 1963), available at 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9283, 91.673075
(promoting amateur drag racing in unmodified cars); Mobile Arts & Sports Ass’n, Inc. v.
United States, 148 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Ala. 1957) (concluding  that a nonprofit’s spon-
sorship of a college football all-star game is an integral part of its educational objectives);
Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195 (concluding that revenue from a college football bowl
game is not subject to tax); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,775 (Feb. 6, 1989) (concluding that
a nonprofit sponsoring a post-season college football bowl game is tax-exempt as a quali-
fied amateur athletic organization promoting a national competition).
5. See, e.g., Wayne Baseball, Inc. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 437 (1999) (promoting
baseball by sponsoring an amateur team with players typically over age 21); Media Sports
League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1093 (1986) (promoting volleyball and other
sports); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-49-018 (Dec. 5, 2008) (promoting an amateur soccer
team composed of males ages 18 through 40).
6. See infra notes 184–93 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., H.R. 10612, 94th Cong. at 423 (2d Sess. 1976), reprinted at 1976-3 C.B.
(Vol. 2) 435 (observing that the IRS’s application of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) has been a “source
of confusion and inequity for amateur sports organizations whereby some gained favored
tax-exempt status while others, apparently equally deserving, did not”), quoted in Hutchin-
son Baseball Enters., Inc. v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 144, 153 (1979), aff’d 696 F.2d 757 (10th Cir.
1982), nonacq. 1980-2 C.B. 2; Robert C. Moot, Jr., Tax Exempt Status of Amateur Sports
Organizations, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1705, 1717–18 (1983) (stating that the IRS has
failed to treat amateur sports organizations consistently); id. at 1727 (stating that the IRS’s
position is inconsistent with the legislative history).
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currently tax-favored organizations and activities that pose a substantial
risk for players, such as the risk of brain damage from concussions.9
Part I of this Article summarizes current law on when a nonprofit
sports-promoting organization qualifies for most-favored tax status,
namely qualification under IRC § 501(c)(3). Current law’s tendency to
obsess over whether a sports-promoting nonprofit is educational favors
some classes of organizations, and not others, even though that focus can
ignore the totality of public benefits an organization provides.
In Part II, this Article makes the case that courts and the IRS should
recognize that nonprofit sports organizations can promote health. Some
of the doctrines that ignore whether sports organizations promote health
were developed over a hundred years ago when sports were primarily for
school students and the idle rich. A doctrine developed in 1904 linking
U.S. schools and sports probably led the IRS to obsess over whether non-
profits promoting sports are educational. This approach is outmoded be-
cause modern social and medical research has determined that our nation
has become much more sedentary at work, that the current level of lei-
sure time activity is inadequate to compensate, and that this inactivity is
associated with an epidemic of chronic diseases, such as cardiovascular
disease and type 2 diabetes. Any concerns that a new approach would
benefit only the idle rich are resolved by requirements that charitable
IRC § 501(c)(3) organizations cannot exclude a significant segment of the
community through excessive fees or other devices. A surprising conse-
quence of a new focus on the promotion of health would be that organi-
zations and activities historically enjoying IRC § 501(c)(3) status while
promoting dangerous sports which jeopardize the mental or physical
health of the players may no longer qualify.
Part III concludes that rethinking the test, rather than clinging to an-
cient precedents, may help reform the world of sports. The reformation
can include fewer spectators on their couches, more participants on the
field, and a reduced obsession with violent sports.
I. CURRENT LAW IGNORES ARGUMENTS THAT SPORTS
PROMOTE HEALTH
Some nonprofits merely instruct individuals about a sport. The IRS has
consistently held that these organizations qualify as educational under
IRC § 501(c)(3) whether the individuals instructed are minors, college
students, or adults.10 The IRS typically cites the language of the applica-
9. See, e.g., George Will, Would We Have to Kill Football in Order to Fix It?, SUN
HERALD (BILOXI, MS), Aug. 6, 2012, at 11, available at 2012 WLNR 16493051. See gener-
ally infra Part II.D.
10. See Rev. Rul. 77-365, 1977-2 C.B. 192 (concluding that an organization conducting
clinics, workshops, lessons, and seminars at municipal parks and recreation areas for per-
sons of all ages about a particular sport qualifies under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) as educational);
Rev. Rul. 65-2, 1965-1 C.B. 227 (involving an organization providing free instruction,
equipment, and facilities to children playing a game); Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-2 C.B. 142
(organization conducting symposiums about sailboat racing primarily for adults).
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ble Treasury Regulations that defines the word educational broadly to
include the “instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of
improving or developing his capabilities.”11
In contrast, for nonprofits promoting sports competition, age is incredi-
bly important. If the competitors are minors or college students, the IRS
consistently concludes that nonprofits promoting sports competition
among these groups qualify as educational under IRC § 501(c)(3).12 But
when the competitors are adults, the IRS refuses to conclude that the
nonprofit promoting sports competition is educational. The IRS typically
employs a rather arbitrary line-drawing approach.13 The IRS quotes the
applicable regulatory definition of the word educational, which includes
the “training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing
his capabilities,”14 acknowledges that sports competition can enhance an
adult’s skills, but the IRS then concludes that the adult participants’ capa-
bilities are neither improved nor advanced.15 The IRS rulings fail to ex-
plain why enhancing one’s skills as an adult does not improve one’s
capabilities.16 Furthermore, the IRS fails to explain why sports competi-
tion improves the capabilities of college students, but it does not improve
the capabilities of senior citizens or other adults.
Some adult sports organizations have qualified under IRC § 501(c)(3)
as charitable on the theory that they promote social welfare or lessen the
burdens of government. However, these categories are available only to
organizations that provide their services for free or charge only a nominal
amount.17 Also, Congress has created a narrow path to qualification for
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959) (also including in the definition of edu-
cational the “instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to
the community”).
12. Rev. Rul. 55-587, 1955-2 C.B. 261 (organization directs and controls high school
athletic competitions); Rev. Rul. 80-215, 1980-2 C.B. 174 (concluding that a nonprofit or-
ganizing local and state-wide competitions for individuals under age 18 both promotes edu-
cation and is charitable because it combats juvenile delinquency); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2005-36-024 (Sept. 9, 2005) (organization sponsors youth golf tournaments); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 37,518 (Apr. 28, 1978) (nonprofit organizes soccer competitions for individu-
als under age 18).
13. Part II.E of this Article discusses, in greater detail, three IRS approaches.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959).
15. Rev. Rul. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126; see also Rev. Rul. 78-98, 1978-1 C.B. 167 (conclud-
ing that the income from the public use of a school’s ski slope and ski-lift is not substan-
tially related to the school’s educational purpose); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-49-018 (Dec.
5, 2008) (stating that an amateur soccer team composed of males age 18 to 40 is not educa-
tional because the promotion of a sport for adults does not “develop their capabilities”);
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,459 (Dec. 26, 1985) (stating that the “promotion of recrea-
tional sports among adults” is not educational under IRC § 501(c)(3)).
16. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-49-018 (Dec. 5, 2008).
17. See, e.g., Peters v. Comm’r, 21 T.C. 55, 59 (1953) (concluding that a foundation
furnishing public swimming facilities for free to all community residents promoted social
welfare and therefore qualified as charitable under IRC § 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 59-310,
1959-2 C.B. 146 (concluding that an organization providing swimming and other recrea-
tional facilities for community residents and only charging a nominal fee “lessen[s] the
burdens of government” and therefore qualifies as charitable under IRC § 501(c)(3)); the
IRS in Revenue Ruling 59-310 specifically refused to follow the approach in the Peters
case, supra, that such an organization qualifies because it promotes social welfare). But see
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-05-002 (Aug. 5, 1984) (concluding that a nonprofit operating a
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nonprofits that assist U.S. Olympic athletes or otherwise promote elite
national or international amateur sports competition.18
A related area that has not drawn as much attention is organizations
promoting noncompetitive athletic activities, commonly described as ex-
ercises or workouts. The IRS has issued at least seven rulings involving
fitness centers or health clubs, with mixed results, but the IRS has re-
jected the claim that these organizations promote health for purposes of
IRC § 501(c)(3).19 Notwithstanding the IRS position, medical research
suggests that these organizations can be important in disease prevention
for adults by encouraging walking, bicycling, and exercising at gyms.20
Under this regime for analyzing sports-promoting nonprofits, the IRS
has denied IRC § 501(c)(3) status to sports organizations promoting
leagues, tournaments, and other competitions in touch football, softball,
soccer, baseball, football, and volleyball among nonelite adult athletes.21
The IRS sometimes states that these organizations fail to qualify as edu-
cational, and at other times the IRS concludes that they fail to qualify
because they have a substantial purpose to promote the recreational or
social interests of the competitors.22
No IRS ruling or court case clearly supports the position that a non-
profit promoting adult nonelite sports qualifies under IRC § 501(c)(3) be-
cause it promotes health. Two court opinions from the 1940s arguably
note the health benefits of sports and physical activity, but on both occa-
sions those courts based their holdings in favor of tax exemption on a
finding that the nonprofit was educational.23 In several situations, a sports
organization’s articles of incorporation or other governing document
stated that it promotes health, or the organization argued that it pro-
health club would be charitable under IRC § 501(c)(3) if its fees are “within the financial
reach of the local community as a whole”).
18. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 501(j) (2014); see infra notes 217–32 and accompanying text.
19. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 204 (10th ed.
2011) (discussing seven IRS rulings under the heading “Fitness Centers”); see also infra
notes 134–39 and accompanying text (discussing Revenue Ruling 79-360 in which the IRS
held that the fitness center’s operations were not charitable, and I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
85-05-002 in which the IRS concluded that the fitness center activities were substantially
related to a charitable purpose because they benefitted the community at large; neverthe-
less, the IRS concluded that the fitness center activities did not promote health under IRC
§ 501(c)(3)).
20. See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
21. See The Media Sports League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1083 (1986) (pro-
moting touch football, softball, and volleyball leagues and other competitions); Wayne
Baseball, Inc. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 437 (1999) (promoting baseball); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 2008-49-018 (Dec. 5, 2008) (promoting soccer); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-13-033
(Mar. 29, 2013) (promoting football).
22. See infra notes 184–93 and accompanying text (denying IRC § 501(c)(3) status be-
cause the organization is not educational); infra notes 200–05 and accompanying text (de-
nying IRC § 501(c)(3) status because the organization has a substantial recreational or
social purpose).
23. Bohemian Gymnastic Ass’n Sokol of N.Y. v. Higgins, 147 F.2d 774, 777 (2d Cir.
1945) (involving an exemption under the social security tax for charitable or educational
nonprofits); United States Lawn Tennis Ass’n v. Comm’r, 47 B.T.A.M. ¶ 42,457 (1942),
available at 1942 WL 9367 (considering an exemption under the predecessor of IRC
§ 501(c)(3)).
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motes health.24 Unfortunately, the IRS consistently disregards these gov-
erning documents and the arguments that a nonprofit sports organization
promotes health.
II. PROPOSAL: THE IRS AND THE COURTS SHOULD
RECOGNIZE THAT SPORTS PROMOTE HEALTH
A. PLACING THE PROMOTION OF HEALTH IN THE STRUCTURE OF
IRC § 501(C)(3) QUALIFICATION
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court agree that the fundamental rea-
son certain nonprofits qualify for the tax benefits of IRC § 501(c)(3) is
that they provide a public benefit at least equal to the value of the IRC
§ 501(c)(3) tax benefits.25 Some commentators have proposed other ex-
planations, but the public benefit approach is widely accepted.26
This public benefit rationale is reflected in at least three tests that a
nonprofit organization must satisfy to qualify under IRC § 501(c)(3).
24. See, e.g., The Media Sports League, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1094 (the organization’s
articles of incorporation “state that [it] is organized to promote . . . the physical and moral
well-being of all athletes . . . .”); Rev. Rul. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126 (“The organization was
formed for the stated purpose[ ] of promoting the health of the general public by encourag-
ing all persons to improve their physical condition . . . .”); Rev. Rul. 55-587, 1955-2 C.B.
261 (the organization was formed for the “purpose[ ] of promoting and protecting the
health of high school students through uniform interscholastic competition . . . .”); I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-05-002 (Aug. 5, 1984) (concluding that the operation of a fitness club
will not be recognized as promoting health under IRC § 501(c)(3)). But see I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 37,518 (Apr. 28, 1978) (indicating that trusts providing recreational opportu-
nities can be charitable because they advance health and tend to reduce crime and juvenile
delinquency).
25. Wayne Baseball, Inc. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 437, 438 (1999) (“The theory
behind the exemption is that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its
relief from the financial burden that would otherwise have to be met from public funds and
that the Government  realizes benefits resulting from private promotion of the general
welfare.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), 1939-1 C.B., pt. 2, 728,
742)); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“Charitable
exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit . . . .”);
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (“Evidently the ex-
emption is made in recognition of the benefit which the public derives from . . . [the]
activities of the [organizations] named, and is intended to aid them . . . .”). This public
benefit approach arguably may not explain the granting of IRC § 501(c)(3) status in all
situations, such as to various religious organizations, which could not be established by the
federal government. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2014) (allowing religious organizations to qual-
ify under IRC § 501(c)(3)); HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 267 (discussing the constitutional
“clause . . . designed to prohibit government from establishing a religion, aiding a religion,
or preferring one religion over another”).
26. See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contribu-
tions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 657, 682 (2001) (stating that the public benefit rationale is the “most widely
accepted rationale”); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribution Deduction,
74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397–98 (1988); see also Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 387, 409 (1998). Many other law review articles propose other rationales. See, e.g.,
Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antith-
esis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 423–24 (1997) (discussing “Atkinson’s altru-
ism theory” in which granting tax benefits to promote virtuous behavior is appropriate);
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive
Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 557 (2010) (discussing a theory based on the redistribu-
tion of resources in society).
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First, the organization must be organized and operated exclusively for
one of the eight purposes listed in the statute.27 The list of eight purposes
includes educational, charitable, religious, and scientific.28 This exclusiv-
ity test is not strictly construed; an organization can have an insubstantial
nonexempt purpose and still qualify under IRC § 501(c)(3).29 Second, the
organization must provide a public benefit rather than a private benefit.30
Third, if an organization operates for a substantial nonexempt purpose,
such as providing social or recreational benefits to its members, it will not
qualify under IRC § 501(c)(3).31
The eight exempt purposes listed in IRC § 501(c)(3) include charitable
purposes, but they do not expressly mention the promotion of health.
Likewise, the Treasury Regulations do not expressly list the promotion of
health among the charitable purposes.32 Nevertheless, the word charita-
ble, for purposes of IRC § 501(c)(3), has its generally accepted legal
meaning.33 As a result, several purposes, including the promotion of
health,34 lessening the burdens of government, combating juvenile delin-
quency,35 and relieving the needs of the poor, are recognized as charita-
ble.36 Many organizations qualify for IRC § 501(c)(3) status under the
charitable category because they promote health, such as hospitals, nurs-
ing homes, clinics, and other health care organizations.37 Also, medical
research organizations striving to prevent diseases qualify under IRC
§ 501(c)(3) because they promote health.38 Unfortunately, the courts and
the IRS have ignored arguments that nonprofit sports organizations pro-
mote health.39
An organization generally must apply to the IRS to obtain IRC
§ 501(c)(3) status.40 There can be many financial benefits from obtaining
an IRS determination that an organization qualifies. The designation al-
lows the organization to avoid paying income tax.41 Also, donors usually
can claim a tax deduction for contributions to the organization, and this
27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2014).
28. Id.
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1959); New Dynamics Found. v. United States,
70 Fed. Cl. 782, 799 (Ct. Cl. 2006) (stating that the word exclusively in the statutory context
is a term of art and does not mean solely); HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 72 (stating that the
law treats the word exclusively in IRC § 501(c)(3) as if it means primarily).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1959).
31. See Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
32. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
33. Id.
34. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 19, at
191–206.
35. See infra note 46.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
37. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 191–206.
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(d)(2)(iii) (1972) (defining the phrase “medical re-
search” to include prevention or control of physical or mental diseases).
39. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
40. See I.R.C. § 508(c)(1) (2014) (excluding churches and organizations with annual
gross receipts of less than $5,000). See generally HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 734–41.
41. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2014). But see I.R.C. §§ 511–13 (2014) (imposing a tax on the
unrelated business taxable income of an otherwise tax-exempt organization).
2015] Promoting Health with Sports 477
can significantly help fundraising efforts.42 In addition, the IRC
§ 501(c)(3) designation may allow the organization to avoid paying prop-
erty and sales taxes, may permit the organization to issue bonds paying
tax-exempt interest, and may allow the organization to qualify for re-
duced postage rates.43
Under current law, it is possible for nonprofits promoting sports to
qualify under IRC § 501(c)(3) in at least four statutory categories.44 First,
certain organizations have qualified as educational.45 Second, some have
qualified as charitable because they contribute to social welfare or com-
bat juvenile delinquency. Unfortunately, this category only appears to be
available to sports organizations that charge either no fee or nominal
fees.46 Third, a nonprofit may qualify if it fosters national or international
amateur sports competition, such as the Olympics or the Pan-American
Games, but organizations in this third category cannot furnish equipment
or facilities to the players.47 Fourth, some have met the tests for being a
qualified amateur sports organization described in I.R.C. §501(j).48 The
nonprofits in this fourth category can provide equipment or facilities, but
the IRS has devised a seven-factor test tending to approve only organiza-
tions that promote or select the U.S. Olympic team, the U.S. team for the
Pan-American Games, or other elite national or international teams.49
The IRS has declared that a nonprofit promoting a sport for nonelite
adult athletes will not meet the test for being a qualified amateur sports
organization because there is no realistic expectation that casual athletes
42. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2014) (listing the same eight exempt purposes as I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2014)); I.R.C. § 2055 (a)(2) (2014) (estate tax charitable deduction); I.R.C.
§ 2522 (a)(2) (2014) (gift tax charitable deduction).
43. See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 47–55 (describing many benefits, including sales tax
exemptions, property tax exemptions, and preferred postal rates); Colombo, supra note 26,
at 703 (discussing ability to issue tax-exempt bonds).
44. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-42-055 (Oct. 17, 2008); see Moot, supra note 8, at
1713–14.
45. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text (discussing organizations that
merely instruct individuals about a sport, and organizations that promote sports competi-
tion for students).
46. See, e.g., Peters v. Comm’r, 21 T.C. 55 (1953) (foundation furnishing public swim-
ming facilities for community residents and charging no fee qualified as charitable because
it promoted social welfare); Rev. Rul. 59-310, 1959-2 C.B. 146 (organization providing a
public swimming pool and other recreational facilities for all community residents for a fee
that was “purely incidental to the orderly operation of the pool” qualified as charitable
because it lessens the burdens of government); Hutchinson Baseball Enters., Inc. v.
Comm’r, 696 F.2d 757, 761 (10th Cir. 1982) (nonprofit organization owning and operating
an amateur baseball team composed primarily of college baseball players qualified as char-
itable because it “further[ed] the development and sportsmanship of children and young
men”).
47. See, e.g., Int’l E22 Class Ass’n v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 93 (1982) (qualifying under IRC
§ 501(c)(3) as an amateur sports organization which does not provide equipment or
facilities).
48. See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,560 (Sept. 30, 1986) (providing a national
training center for developing and training athletes with the potential to qualify for the
Olympic Games and engaging in several other activities); I.R.S. Gen Couns. Mem. 39,459
(Dec. 26, 1985) (organization recognized by the U.S. Olympic Committee as the national
governing body of the sport).
49. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-49-018 (Dec. 5, 2008).
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will compete in the Olympics, the Pan-American Games, or any other
international or national competitions.50
B. CAN ADULT SPORTS PROMOTE HEALTH?
1. Medical Research, Inactivity, and the Epidemic of Chronic Diseases
“[The] human genome evolved within an environment of high physical
activity.”51 We are “designed by nature . . . to move.”52 Researchers have
determined that modern chronic diseases, such as type 2 diabetes, are
rarely the result of gene defects,53 but instead are “highly dependent on
the environment.”54
Chronic diseases develop over an extended time period, are “long-last-
ing, and can be controlled but not cured.”55 They include heart disease,
diabetes, some forms of cancer, obesity, osteoporosis, and several other
conditions.56 Researchers studying chronic diseases have seen a sharp rise
over the last few decades. For example, from 1980 to 2008, obesity rates
doubled for adults and tripled for children.57 “More than one-third of
U.S. adults (over 72 million people) . . . are obese.”58 Researchers now
estimate that one in two adults have at least one chronic illness.59 Several
commentators describe the rise of chronic diseases in the U.S. as an
epidemic.60
Researchers report that the increase of chronic diseases is associated
50. Id. (stating that the organization “has not provided information that its athletes
are of a caliber that makes them serious contenders” for the Olympics); see also I.R.S.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,775 (Feb. 6, 1989) (concluding that an organization promoting a
college football bowl game could be a qualified amateur athletic organization but only
after emphasizing that at the time there was no college football playoff system to deter-
mine a national champion; thus, the favorable status was only available because the partic-
ular bowl game could influence the voters choosing the national champion).
51. Booth et al., supra note 2, at 774.
52. Study: Everyday Activities Might Have Same Health Benefits as Going to Gym,
WAUSAU DAILY HERALD (WAUSAU, WI), Feb. 17, 2013, at S3, available at 2013 WLNR
4206367.
53. Booth et al., supra note 2, at 777.
54. Id.
55. SICK! EPIDEMIC CHRONIC DISEASES, http://www.bestmasterofscienceinnursing
.com/epidemic/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015); Booth et al., supra note 2, at 775.
56. Booth et al., supra note 2, at 779.
57. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Obesity: Halting the Epidemic by
Making Health Easier (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/publications/
aag/pdf/2011/obesity-aag-web.508.pdf.
58. Id.; see also infra note 74 (discussing the test for obesity).
59. SICK! EPIDEMIC CHRONIC DISEASES, supra note 55.
60. See, e.g., id.; Countdown Reason #8: How Did We Miss This Chronic Disease Epi-
demic?, DONNA JACKSON NAKAZAWA ( Feb. 12, 2013) http://donnajacksonnakazawa.com/
countdown-reason-8-how-did-we-miss-this-chronic-disease-epidemic; see also Richard Pe-
rez-Pena, Hong Kong Group to Give Harvard’s School of Public Health $350 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2014, at A11, available at www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/education/harvards-
school-of-public-helath-gets-350-million-from-the-morningside-foundation.html (describ-
ing global obesity as a “pandemic”).
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with inactivity,61 poor diet, smoking, and other factors.62 They maintain
that a “sedentary population [has a] predisposition to modern chronic
diseases”63 and that “[a] strong association exists between . . . inactivity
and the emergence of modern chronic disease in 20th century industrial-
ized societies.”64 A report concludes, “Physical inactivity is one of the
major underlying causes of premature mortality in the United States.”65
In effect, we are genetically designed to move a lot, and bad things hap-
pen when we do not. Chronic diseases cause suffering for the patients66
and their caregivers, grief for the patient’s family and friends upon death,
and increased costs for the patient’s family, employer, society, and the
U.S. healthcare system.67
Inactivity has been associated with seventeen major chronic diseases or
unhealthy conditions.68 Three major chronic diseases associated with in-
activity, referred to as the triad,69 are cardiovascular disease, obesity, and
type 2 diabetes.70
The leading cause of death in the U.S. by a wide margin is cardiovascu-
lar disease.71 “Since 1900, . . . cardiovascular disease has been the number
one killer in the U.S. every year” except in 1918.72 It is the cause of ap-
proximately forty percent of all deaths, and it is the primary or a contrib-
uting cause of approximately sixty percent of all deaths.73
61. See infra notes 68–84.
62. See Booth et al., supra note 2, at 777–78 (discussing diet modification); see, e.g.,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Diabetes Successes and Opportunities for
Population-Based Prevention and Control (2011), http://ww.cdc.gov/chronic disease/re-
sources/publications/aag/pdf/2011/diabetes-AAG-2011-508.pdf (“Type 2 diabetes can be
prevented through healthy food choices, physical activity, and weight loss.”); NAKAZAWA,
supra note 60 (including expanded lifespans).
63. Booth et al., supra note 2, at 774 (also stating that we are “genetically programmed
to expect physical activity”).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 778 (citing a 1998 report from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention).
66. Id. at 775 (“Chronic disease conditions cause great human suffering affecting
[ninety] million Americans . . . .”).
67. See infra notes 103–09 and accompanying text; Booth et al., supra note 2, at 775.
68. Booth et al., supra note 2, at 774.
69. Id. at 775.
70. Id.; see also SJI Recognized by Heart Ass’n as Fit-Friendly Site, DAILY JOURNAL
(VINELAND, NJ), June 25, 2014, at A2, reprinted at 2014 WLNR 17202943 (including high
blood pressure); Booth et al., supra note 2, at 775 (including osteoporosis and frailty in old
age, referred to as sarcopenia); Y. Claire Wang et al., Health and Economic Burden of the
Projected Obesity Trends in the USA and the UK, 378 THE LANCET 815, (Aug. 27, 2011)
(listing other chronic diseases such as high blood pressure, esophageal cancer, colon can-
cer, osteoporosis, and gallbladder cancer).
71. Actual Causes of Death in the U.S.: Not What You Think, COMMON SENSE FAMILY
DOCTOR (Aug. 26, 2011), http://commonsensemd.blogspot.com/2011/08/actual-causes-of-
death-in-us-not-what.html; see also Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the
United States, 2000, 291 AMA, 1238, 1239 (2004) (listing heart disease as the leading cause
of death in 2000).
72. Booth et al., supra note 2, at 775–76.
73. Id. at 776.
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In considering obesity,74 a group of researchers reviewed data from
National Health Surveys and found that the average U.S. male age forty
to fifty weighed 169 pounds in 1960, and his counterpart weighed 201
pounds in 2006.75 These researchers calculate that the weight gained by
failing to burn calories at work adds up to this increase in average
weight.76
Diabetes is the seventh leading cause of death and the “leading cause
of kidney failure, new cases of blindness, and amputations of feet and legs
not related to accidents or injuries.”77 Type 2 diabetes accounts for over
ninety percent of diabetes cases.78 Type 2 diabetes reportedly has reached
epidemic proportions.79 There was a “six-fold increase [of diabetes
cases] . . . between 1958 and 1993.”80 As further evidence of an epidemic,
throughout the 1980s, the percentage of adults diagnosed with diabetes
each year was between 3.4% and 3.6%.81 In contrast, from 2008 through
2011, the figure ranged from 8.4% to 9% each year.82 “If trends continue,
1 of 3 U.S. adults will have diabetes by 2050.”83 In addition, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that 79 million U.S. adults
are prediabetic, meaning they are at high risk of developing type 2 diabe-
tes.84 Researchers maintain that type 2 diabetes can be prevented by
physical activity and good diet.85
In commenting on the chronic disease epidemic, a group of researchers
states that the “biomedical establishment” has focused on treating ex-
isting conditions rather than prevention.86 This same group evaluates the
biomedical establishment’s approach by asking “Are we winning the war
on chronic disease?” The group then concludes, “the answer is a resound-
ing no!”87
2. Occupational Inactivity and Leisure Time Activity
In evaluating whether there really is an association between chronic
disease and inactivity, it is necessary to consider trends in activity levels.
Studies sometimes measure physical activity in two categories: an occupa-
74. Researchers will classify an adult with a weight in excess of what is generally con-
sidered healthy as overweight or obese based on a number referred to as the body mass
index, or BMI. BMI is determined by height and weight. Researchers classify an adult with
a BMI of 25 to 29 as overweight and classify an adult with a BMI over 30 as obese. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Defining Overweight and Obese, http://www.cdc.gov/
obesity/adult/defining.html (last updated Apr. 27, 2012).
75. Church et al., supra note 3, at 2.
76. See id.
77. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 62.
78. Id.
79. Booth et al., supra note 2, at 776.
80. Id.
81. SICK! EPIDEMIC OF CHRONIC DISEASES, supra note 55.
82. Id.
83. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 62.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Booth et al., supra note 2, at 774.
87. Id. at 775; see also NAKAZAWA, supra note 60.
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tional category, and a leisure time category.88 In regards to leisure time
activity, the recommended guideline is generally one hundred and fifty
minutes of moderate to vigorous physical activity per week for ten min-
utes or longer at a time.89 Despite the significant rise in the incidence of
chronic disease, the percentage of people attaining the recommended
physical activity guidelines during leisure time has increased since 1998.
For example, for those age 45 to 64, the increase was from 11.4 percent in
1998 to 17.5 percent in 2011.90
Unfortunately, the percentage of people attaining the physical activity
guidelines91 is small,92 and the percentage of people achieving the guide-
lines drops as age increases. According to a 2012 report from the Centers
for Disease Control, the following percentages of people in the following
age groups met the guidelines: 26 percent for ages 18 to 44, 17.5 percent
for ages 45 to 64, 11.3 percent for ages 65 to 74, and 7.7 percent for ages
75 and over.93 In addition, leisure time is a relatively small part of the
total hours in a week for working adults.94
In contrast to leisure time activity levels, the amount of physical activ-
ity at work has dropped sharply. In 1960, approximately 48 percent of
workers engaged in at least moderately intense physical activity on the
job,95 and more than 30 percent of U.S. private sector jobs were in manu-
facturing. Other significant sectors included agriculture, mining, and log-
ging.96 By 2008, only approximately 20 percent of workers engaged in at
least moderately intense physical activity on the job.97 A big part of this
change has been the rise in service occupations. In the 1960s, the occupa-
tion categories consisting of professional services, health care, education,
and leisure and hospitality made up only 20 percent of U.S. occupations;
by 2008 that percentage had risen to 43 percent.98
Because of this shift from a physically active work force to a more sed-
entary one, “[f]rom 1960 to 2008 there was an approximate drop in occu-
pation-related daily energy expenditure of 140 calories for men and 124
88. Church et al., supra note 3.
89. See Many Overestimate Exercise Intensity: York University Study, NEWSFILE, June
30, 2014, at 173, available at 2014 WLNR 17385287.
90. Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Health Statistics, HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2012, 234 (2013) (DHHS Publication No. 2013-1232), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus12.pdf.
91. Church et al., supra note 3, at 4 (describing the guidelines as “150 minutes per
week of moderate intensity activity or 75 minutes per week of vigorous intensity activity”).
92. See supra note 89; U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PHYSICAL ACTIV-
ITY & HEALTH, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 14 (1996), available at http:www
.cdc.gov/nccdphp/sgr/pdf/execsum.pdf (stating that only fifteen percent of U.S. adults en-
gage in vigorous physical activity at least three times a week).
93. Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Health Statistics, HEALTH, supra
note 90.
94. DAILY JOURNAL, supra note 70, at A2; see also Church et al., supra note 3, at 1, 4.
95. Church et al., supra note 3, at 2.
96. Id.
97. Id. (also reporting that by 2008, only twelve percent of U.S. jobs were in
manufacturing).
98. Id.
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calories for women.”99 The researchers calculated that “this reduction in
occupational energy expenditure account[ed] for a large portion of the
observed increase in mean U.S. weight over the last [five] decades.”100
Again, for the average U.S. male age 40 to 50, this increase was from 169
pounds in 1960 to 201 pounds in 2006.101 Because “it is unlikely that there
will be a return to occupations that demand moderate levels of physical
activity . . . [it is important to promote] physically active lifestyles outside
of the work day.”102
3. Costs of Inactivity
Researchers state that addressing the inactivity problem “would be an
investment to avoid U.S. healthcare system bankruptcy.”103 The costs as-
sociated with obesity alone are substantial. “[O]bese individuals [have]
medical costs [thirty percent] higher than those with normal weight,”104
have twenty-seven percent more physician visits, and spend eighty per-
cent more on prescription drugs.105 “The annual extra medical costs of
obesity in the USA were estimated at $75 billion in 2003,”106 and “em-
ployers face $12.7 billion in annual medical expenses due to obesity
alone.”107 Additional societal costs include “decreased years of disability-
free life, increased mortality before retirement, early retirements, disabil-
ity pensions, and work absenteeism or reduced productivity (sometimes
called presenteeism).”108 Lost productivity costs are significant. “The an-
nual cost from presenteeism [for a] very obese [employee] . . . was [esti-
mated at] the equivalent of 1 month of lost productivity . . . .”109
4. Benefits from Types of Physical Activity
The U.S. Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion reports
there is strong evidence that regular physical activity improves cardiovas-
cular and cardiorespiratory fitness and lowers the risk of coronary heart
disease, type 2 diabetes, obesity, colon cancer, stroke, and early death.110
The federal government’s suggested guideline for physical aerobic activ-
99. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id. at 4.
103. See Booth et al., supra note 2, at 775; id. at 776 (stating that “our health care
system is headed for deep trouble unless we soon find . . . preventative measures”).
104. Wang et al., supra note 70, at 815.
105. Id. at 816.
106. Id.
107. DAILY JOURNAL, supra note 70, at A2.
108. Wang et al., supra note 70, at 817.
109. Id.
110. OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY
GUIDELINES, http://www.health.gov/paguidelines/guidelines/chapter2.aspx; see also MAYO
CLINIC, EXERCISE AND CHRONIC DISEASE: GET THE FACTS, http://www.mayoclinic.org/
healthy-living/fitness/in-depth/exercise-and-chronic-disease/art (last updated June 7, 2015)
(stating that in regards to type 2 diabetes, “[r]egular exercise can help insulin more effec-
tively lower your blood sugar level”).
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ity is “150 minutes a week of moderate-intensity . . . activity, such as brisk
walking, [running, bicycling, or swimming].”111 Scientists analyzing the
link between inactivity and chronic diseases have concluded that
“[u]ndoubtedly, one of the best public health approaches would be to
concentrate on measures to prevent obesity.”112 Researchers can analyze
physical activities based on their ability to (i) improve aerobic capacity,
and (ii) build muscle strength.113
Aerobic activity “causes a person’s heart to beat faster than usual”114
and “require[s] the integrated efforts of the heart, lungs, and circulation
to deliver oxygen to the metabolically active muscle mass.”115 “Aerobic
capacity declines [eight percent] to [ten percent] per decade in
nonathletic subjects . . . [but declines by only five percent] per decade in
endurance-trained subjects who continue to exercise vigorously.”116
Also, weight lifting and other resistance exercises117 can have impor-
tant health benefits. Muscle mass declines with age without resistance ex-
ercises. Until age 50, adults tend to lose five pounds of muscle mass every
decade, but after age 50 “the rate of muscle loss doubles to a debilitating
ten pounds every ten years.”118 Muscle loss is associated with multiple
health problems involving movement, balance, and bone density.119 Mus-
cle mass also has an impact on metabolic rate. “[L]ess muscle means
fewer calories burned and more calories stored as fat every day.”120 With
no resistance exercise, every pound of skeletal muscle burns five to six
calories a day to maintain tissue function, but with regular resistance ex-
ercise, the number jumps to nine calories daily.121 As a result, researchers
conclude that “regular resistance exercise [can be] a highly effective
111. OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, supra note 110, at 1
(stating that meeting this guideline “consistently reduces the risk of many chronic diseases
and other adverse health outcomes”).
112. Booth et al., supra note 2, at 776; see also id. at 778 (“With the possible exception
of diet modification, we know of no single intervention with greater promise than physical
exercise to reduce the risk of virtually all chronic diseases simultaneously.”).
113. OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, supra note 110 (dis-
cussing aerobic activity, muscle-strengthening activity, and bone-strengthening activity, al-
though the report states that “bone-strengthening activities can also be aerobic and muscle
strengthening”).
114. Id.
115. AMERICAN HEART ASS’N, ASSESSMENT OF FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY IN CLINICAL
AND RESEARCH APPLICATIONS, http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/102/13/1591.full (last
visited June 7, 2015).
116. Id.
117. OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, supra note 110, at 2
(describing “resistance training” as activities which “cause[ ] the body’s muscles to work or
hold against an applied force or weight”).
118. Wayne L. Wescott, 10 Reasons to Continue Resistance Training, HERALD NEWS
(FALL RIVER, MASS.), June 23, 2014, at B10, available at 2014 WLNR 17055604; see also
Clarence Bass, Father of Aerobics Pumps More Iron, RIPPED, http://www.cbass.com/
CooperBook.htm (last visited June 7, 2015) (“As you grow older, the need to do strength
training becomes increasingly important to help you retard the loss of muscle and bone
mass.”).
119. Wescott, supra note 118, at B10.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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means for maintaining desirable body weight and optimal body
composition.”122
A physician and leading fitness expert, Doctor Kenneth Cooper, rec-
ommends a mix of aerobic and resistance exercise based on age. “At age
40 and younger, he suggests 80% aerobics and 20% strength, age 41 to 50,
70/30, age 51 to 60, 60/40, and at age 61 and older, 55/45.”123
C. OTHER CONDITIONS FOR IRC § 501(C)(3) QUALIFICATION:
REASONABLE FEES AND OTHER COMMUNITY
BENEFIT CONCERNS
A potential concern with allowing sports-promoting nonprofits to en-
joy the tax benefits of IRC § 501(c)(3) status is that the wealthy will form
clubs and charge excessive fees to exclude segments of the community.
This concern is addressed by existing doctrines.
Under IRC § 501(c)(3), the term charitable has its generally accepted
legal meaning,124 and as a result, “[c]ollateral principles derived from the
law of charitable trusts” apply for determining federal tax exemption.125
Two collateral principles are that the nonprofit’s activities must benefit a
charitable class, and any fees charged must be within the financial reach
of a significant segment of the community.
In regards to charitable class, an organization will not qualify as chari-
table if the benefited group is very limited.126  At one time, IRC
§ 501(c)(3) status under the charitable category was restricted to organi-
zations benefiting the poor.127 However, in the 1970s, the IRS issued two
key rulings reflecting a much more expansive view.128 In one ruling, the
IRS concluded that an organization need not benefit only the poor as
long as a significant segment of the community can benefit.129 In the
other, the IRS considered a law library which limited “access to . . . a
designated class of persons.”130 In concluding that the law library quali-
fied under IRC § 501(c)(3), the IRS emphasized that the library served a
significant number of people, and the library imposed the restrictions be-
122. Id.
123. Bass, supra note 118 (quoting Doctor Cooper); see KENNETH H. COOPER, AER-
OBICS vii-x (1968) (Bantam Books) (discussing Doctor Cooper’s qualifications).
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959); see also Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113.
125. HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 166.
126. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-17-067 (Apr. 30, 2010).
127. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (regarding homes for the aged), modi-
fied by Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. This approach denied IRC § 501(c)(3) status to
social clubs and fraternal organizations. See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 166 (citing Rev.
Rul. 56-403, 1956-2 C.B. 307).
128. See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 170 (stating that “[t]he concept of what is charitable
is continually changing and evolving”); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (D.D.C.
1971) (“[C]hanges are wrought by changes in moral and ethical precepts generally held, or
by changes in relative values assigned to different and sometimes competing and even con-
flicting interests of society.”), aff’d sub nom.; Colt v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
129. Rev. Rul. 79-18, 1979-1 C.B. 194 (involving a home for the aged).
130. Rev. Rul. 75-196, 1975-2 C.B. 155.
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cause of its limited size and scope.131 Thus, to qualify as charitable under
IRC § 501(c)(3), a nonprofit promoting sports must serve a significant
number of people consistent with the size and scope of its resources.
The second restriction is the amount of fees that a charitable IRC
§ 501(c)(3) organization may charge. A nonprofit promoting nonelite
adult sports may need to charge the players fees to cover its operating
costs, rather than relying on donations. The IRS approach to organiza-
tions financed by fees has evolved over time, as demonstrated by a series
of rulings involving nursing homes. In a 1957 ruling, the IRS concluded
that a nursing home would only qualify for IRC § 501(c)(3) status as
charitable if it provided its services for free or for amounts below cost.132
In 1972, the IRS retreated from this position and concluded that a nursing
home providing services “at the lowest feasible cost” would qualify as
charitable under IRC § 501(c)(3).133 In 1979, the IRS further modified
the standard to allow otherwise qualifying nursing homes to charge fees
“within the financial reach of a significant segment of the community’s
elderly persons.”134
Similarly, nonprofits promoting nonelite adult athletics should only
qualify as charitable under IRC § 501(c)(3) if their fees are affordable for
a significant segment of the community. A 1984 IRS ruling involving the
unrelated business income tax may provide some guidance on how this
standard could apply. In the 1984 ruling, the organization already quali-
fied under IRC § 501(c)(3) and subsequently opened a health club with a
swimming pool, gymnasium, fitness area, weight training room, exercise
room, and handball and squash courts.135  The health club solicited mem-
berships from the general public and had two classes of members. The
fees for one class were significantly higher and were “comparable to fees
at commercial health clubs.”136 The members paying the higher fees had
access to a separate exercise room, separate showers, and individual lock-
ers. After discussing a 1979 ruling137 in which the IRS held that another
health club did not contribute importantly to an organization’s charitable
purpose because its fees were comparable to commercial health club fees,
the IRS stated in 1984 that an organization may be charitable even if it
charges “commercially comparable fees.”138 As evidence of the af-
fordability of its fees, the organization in the 1984 ruling provided a com-
parison of its member income and occupation data with the income and
occupation data of the community the organization served. Also, the or-
ganization submitted information on the average family’s discretionary
131. Id.
132. Rev. Rul. 57-467, 1957-2 C.B. 313, superseded by Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B.
145.
133. Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145; see HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 170.
134. Rev. Rul. 79-18, 1979-1 C.B. 194.
135. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-05-002 (Aug. 5, 1984).
136. Id.
137. Rev. Rul. 79-360, 1979-2 C.B. 236.
138. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-05-002 (Aug. 5, 1984), explained in I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,327 (Jan. 18, 1985).
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recreational expenses as reported in a recent edition of the Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States.139 The IRS concluded the health club fees were
“within the financial reach of the local community as a whole” because
the fees were “affordable by most segments of the community served.”140
Although this 1984 ruling might be read to suggest the IRS will grant
IRC § 501(c)(3) status to nonprofits promoting casual exercise, the appli-
cability of the ruling is severely limited. The ruling states that it applies
only to the organization receiving the ruling, and it cannot be used or
cited as precedent by any other organization.141 Also, the IRS expressly
refused to recognize the activities as charitable on the grounds that the
organization promotes health. The IRS stated, “While many of [the or-
ganization’s] activities may relate to preventive and recuperative health
care in the broad sense of being consistent with medical principles and
conducive or beneficial to physical and mental soundness, we do not rec-
ognize such activities as promoting health within the meaning of section
501(c)(3) of the Code.”142 The IRS concluded that the activities were for
charitable purposes under IRC § 501(c)(3) because they benefitted the
community at large, and refused to find that the activities promote health.
Also, the ruling involved the unrelated business income tax, not whether
an organization qualified under IRC § 501(c)(3). Finally, the organization
in the ruling had two classes of members, and one class apparently paid
fees significantly below comparable fees at commercial health clubs. The
ruling failed to provide detailed information about each class. Perhaps if
the organization had not offered the cheap second-tier memberships, the
activities would not have qualified as charitable. As a result, the IRS may
have reached a different result if the club had charged all patrons the
same fee sufficient to cover costs.
D. POTENTIALLY SURPRISING CONSEQUENCES INVOLVING
DANGEROUS SPORTS
This Article’s proposal, which seriously considers the health effects for
players, could have surprising consequences for organizations that pro-
mote dangerous sports and have traditionally enjoyed IRC § 501(c)(3)
status. These organizations may have qualified under IRC § 501(c)(3)’s
educational category because they primarily provide instruction about a
sport, or because they promote competition among youth or college stu-
dents. Under the proposed approach, their most-favored tax status could
be in jeopardy.
A complexity in evaluating whether sports organizations are truly edu-
cational is that the relevant statute provides no substantive definition of
139. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-05-002 (Aug. 5, 1984) (considering the recreational ex-
penses in 1978 as published in the 1984 edition of the STATISTICAL ABSTRACT).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 8 (citing I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3)).
142. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-05-002 (Aug. 5, 1984) (emphasis added).
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the word educational.143 While the regulations provide a definition, that
definition is malleable.144 The regulatory definition refers to “improving
or developing [an individual’s] capabilities,”145 but it provides no signifi-
cant guidance on the type of capabilities that must be improved or devel-
oped.146 On one occasion, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held this
regulatory definition unconstitutionally vague.147 On another occasion,
the court stated “[w]e do not attempt a definition”148 of the word educa-
tional and stated that “attempting a definition suitable for all comers,
IRS, or any legislature, court, or other administrator is beset with difficul-
ties which are obvious.”149
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in dicta, has suggested
that the term educational should have an association with mental develop-
ment. The court indicated that “intellectual[ ] appeal[ ]” and “help[ ] in a
learning process” are important elements of an educational organiza-
tion’s activities.150 A new requirement that sports organizations provide
some likelihood of mental development to qualify as educational would
be particularly appropriate in connection with this Article’s proposal that
courts and the IRS should seriously consider whether sports organiza-
tions promote health. Under this proposed approach, to qualify under
IRC § 501(c)(3), most sports promoting organizations would need to
prove they either (i) further mental development, or (ii) promote
health.151
Under this proposed approach, some organizations promoting danger-
ous contact sports may be hard-pressed to prove continued qualification
under IRC § 501(c)(3), for example, because of the possible risks of brain
damage. In the last decade, many researchers have focused on concus-
sions and sports,152 and they have noted a disturbing trend. From 2000 to
143. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2014) (providing no definition of the word educational).
144. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959).
145. Id.
146. The regulation does not define whether the capacities developed must be mental,
moral, physical, or otherwise. The regulations provide a list of examples, including
“[m]useums, zoos, planetariums, [and] symphony orchestras.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(3)(ii) (Example 4) (1959).
147. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding
that the regulation violates the right of free speech, in part because it lacks the “requisite
clarity . . . in explaining . . . its substantive requirements”).
148. Nat’l All. v. United States, 710 F.2d 868, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 875. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 238.
151. Organizations supporting U.S. Olympic athletes or other elite U.S. athletes com-
peting in national or international competitions could still qualify under IRC § 501(c)(3) as
an amateur sports organization. See infra note 229 and accompanying text. Also, some
sports nonprofits might qualify as charitable organizations. See supra notes 17–18 and ac-
companying text.
152. Many researchers study sports, concussions, and brain damage, and this research is
especially challenging for at least two reasons. First, players frequently hide concussion
symptoms to stay in the game. This makes concussion detection and counting difficult. For
example, “Estimates by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention range anywhere
from 1.6 million to 3.8 million sports-related brain injuries in the U.S. annually.” LINDA
CARROL & DAVID ROSNER, THE CONCUSSION CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A SILENT EPIDEMIC
xii (2011); see also Sean Gregory, The Problem with Football: How to Make It Safer, TIME,
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2010, for players age eight to thirteen, trips to the emergency room for
sports-related brain injuries doubled, and for players age fourteen
through nineteen the number tripled.153 “Emergency rooms now treat
175,000 kids each year for sports-related brain injuries.”154 These youth
injuries may set the stage for adult problems. “Concussion damage can
remain hidden for years only to show up later as early-onset demen-
tia.”155 “Nearly a quarter of a million new patients turn up each year with
long-term deficits resulting from . . . so-called mild traumatic brain inju-
ries.”156 Although some experts disagree,157 others maintain that brain
trauma from playing football is associated with early-onset Alzheimer’s
disease, death resulting from the brain disease chronic traumatic en-
cephalopathy, depression, the inability to work, and the inability to func-
tion without a caregiver.158
Players involved in many sports suffer concussions and related brain
injuries, but football draws a great deal of attention, in part because it is
America’s favorite spectator sport.159 One famous columnist opines,
“[A]ccumulating evidence about . . . the human body [and especially] the
brain . . . compel[s] the conclusion that football is a mistake because the
body is not built to absorb, and cannot be adequately modified by train-
ing or protected by equipment to absorb, the game’s kinetic energies.”160
In football, a player may hit another player with “fifteen hundred pounds
of force at speeds approaching twenty-five miles per hour . . . [possibly
generating an] impact . . . [at] ninety-eight times the force of gravity.”161
Jan. 28, 2010 (stating that “more than [fifty percent] of concussed athletes are suspected of
failing to report their symptoms”). Second, concussion symptoms may at first be hard to
notice, and concussions do not always have the same symptoms. Ken Belson, Concussion
Guidelines Are Revised to Stress Individual Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2013, at B9
(“[C]oncussions are too idiosyncratic to be categorized neatly.”).
153. CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 152, at xii.
154. J. R. Moehringer, Football Is Dead; Long Live Football, ESPN THE MAGAZINE,
Sept. 3, 2012, at 46, 52 (reporting statistics from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention).
155. CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 152, at xiii.
156. Id. at xii.
157. See Gary Mihoces, Documentary says NFL is a ‘League of Denial’, USA TODAY,
Oct. 8, 2013, at 3C (“There’s no proof at this point in time determining that concussions are
an isolative factor in causing CTE” (quoting Michael Collins, Director of the Sports
Medicine Concussion Program at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center)); MARK
FAINARU-WADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL: THE NFL, CONCUSSIONS, AND
THE BATTLE FOR TRUTH 343 (2013) (“The vast majority of the neuroscience community
does not believe that research has established a causal relationship linking repetitive head
trauma in football and CTE . . . .” (quoting Kevin Guskiewicz, Professor at the University
of North Carolina and winner of a MacArthur genius award)).
158. See CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 152, at xiii (dementia); Ken Belson, N.F.L.
Doctor Says Disease Is Overstated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, at B14, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/sports/football/doctor-for-nfl-says-study-overstates-effects-
of-cte.html?pagewaited=all (Alzheimer’s disease and chronic traumatic encephalopathy);
FAINARU-WADA & FAINARU, supra note 157, at 170 (depression); Will, supra note 9, at
A11 (discussing several football players who committed suicide).
159. CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 152, at 41.
160. Will, supra note 9, at 11.
161. CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 152, at 42–43.
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A 2001 study found that there are over one million boys playing high
school football. Half will sustain a concussion during their four years of
high school, and more than a third will sustain multiple concussions.162
An advocate argues, “We’re exposing more than [one] million [high
school] kids to early-onset brain damage and we [do not] know yet how
to prevent it.”163 A report found that thirty percent of college football
players have had two or more concussions.164 Another study concludes
that, “College players with [three] or more concussions are over [three]
times more likely to sustain a new concussion.”165
Football gets a lot of attention, but other sports also pose significant
risks of concussions. Hockey is a collision sport with players traveling at
high speeds, and reportedly, professional hockey players are five times
more likely than professional football players to suffer a concussion.166 In
half-pipe skiing, even the elites suffer concussions in this extreme sport in
which participants “hurtle themselves three stories in the air [and try to
land safely] on a hard-packed [curved sheet of ice and snow].”167 Boxers
absorb “repeated blows [to the head that] set many of them up for
neurodegenerative disease.”168 Boxing inspired the phrase punch drunk,
and the medical community accepted the related syndrome, dementia
pugilistica, as reputable science in 1973.169
Although much concussion research focuses on men, women playing
college hockey suffer concussions at double the rate of men playing col-
lege hockey and football.170 Also, women have significantly more concus-
sions than men when playing soccer or basketball.171
If an organization’s activities must have “intellectual[ ] appeal[ ]”172
and “help[ ] in a learning process”173 to be educational, some organiza-
tions promoting traditional sports that diminish mental capacity for many
participants may have difficulty proving IRC § 501(c)(3) status under the
162. Id. at 26; Gregory, supra note 152 (stating that in 2010, 1.2 million students played,
and annually 43,000 to 67,000 report having a concussion “though the true incidence is
likely much higher [because] more than [fifty percent] of concussed athletes are suspected
of failing to report their symptoms”).
163. Gary Milhoces, USA Football Puts Focus on Safety, USA TODAY, Mar. 4, 2013, at
3C (quoting Chris Nowinski, a former college football player and professional wrestler).
164. Jim Thomas, Frequency of Injury Among College Athletes, LIVESTRONG.COM (Aug.
11, 2011), http://www.livestrong.com/article/513231-frequency-of-injury-among-college-
athletes.
165. CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 152, at 25.
166. Id. at 56.
167. Rachel George, Head Injuries Soar on Halfpipe, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2013, at
1C, available at www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2013/02/25/snowboarders-skiers-
kevin-pearce-concern-concussions/1947593 (reporting that two-time Olympic gold medalist
Shaun White has suffered nine concussions).
168. CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 152, at xiii.
169. See id. at 185; FAINARU-WADA & FAINARU, supra note 157, at 158–59.
170. CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 152, at 56.
171. Id. at 27 (reporting that women have fifty percent more concussions in youth soc-
cer, approximately thirty percent more concussions in college soccer, three times as many
concussions in youth basketball, and sixty percent more concussions in college basketball).
172. Nat’l All. v. United States, 710 F.2d 868, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
173. Id.
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educational category. These organizations also may have difficulty prov-
ing that they promote health if a large percentage of participants suffer
injuries or disabilities. When evaluating the mental and physical impact
on players, relevant factors could include, on the one hand, the number
and percentage of players injured, the nature and severity of the injuries,
and the immediate and long-term consequences of the injuries. On the
other hand, positive consequences from a sport should be considered,
such as the intellectual stimulation provided both for beginners and ex-
perienced players and the positive health impacts such as greater muscu-
lar strength, balance, and increased cardiovascular capacity.174
A switch to this new approach could deliver a disturbing shock to some
traditional sports programs that have long enjoyed the government sub-
sidy of most-favored tax status. Even if a bona fide school sponsoring
dangerous sports could retain its IRC § 501(c)(3) status because its pri-
mary purpose is still education and the dangerous sports are insubstantial
compared to the school’s total activities,175 any net income generated by
the dangerous sport might be taxed as unrelated business income.176 Sim-
ilarly, there could be surprises for community youth sports programs pro-
moting dangerous sports. Nevertheless, this more balanced approach
would be appropriate under the fundamental purpose of IRC § 501(c)(3).
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have declared that an IRC
§ 501(c)(3) organization should provide a public benefit at least commen-
surate with the value of the tax subsidies provided with IRC § 501(c)(3)
status.177
E. EVALUATING THE IRS’S POSITIONS ON NONELITE ADULT SPORTS
Key tests for qualifying under IRC § 501(c)(3) involve multiple fact
determinations, so the courts and the IRS have some flexibility in this
area.178 First, the definitions of charitable and educational are malleable
and inclusive.179 Second, the statute provides that a nonprofit must be
operated exclusively for a tax-exempt purpose,180 but the regulations and
the court opinions are clear that an insubstantial nonexempt purpose will
174. See supra notes 110–23 and accompanying text (regarding the benefits of activities
that increase aerobic capacity and promote muscular development).
175. See Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)
(stating that an organization will not qualify under IRC § 501(c)(3) if it has a substantial
nonexempt purpose).
176. See I.R.C. §§ 511–13 (2014) (imposing an income tax on an otherwise tax-exempt
organization’s net income from activities not related to an exempt purpose).
177. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Church of Bost. v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 102, 108 (1978); N. Am. Sequential
Sweepstakes v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1087, 1094–95 (1981); St. Louis Sci. Fiction v. Comm’r, 49
T.C.M. (CCH) 1126, 1129 (1985); see also infra note 181.
179. See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 165 (“Conceptually, the term charitable has a
broad, wide-ranging, multifaceted meaning.”); id. at 247 (In regards to educational pur-
poses, “tax exemption is not dependent on the subjects under instruction or the number or
motives of those being instructed . . . .”).
180. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2014).
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not disqualify an organization.181 In applying this operational test, courts
and the IRS first analyze a nonprofit’s activities, but then must consider
the purpose for each activity.182 Different people can have different pur-
poses for engaging in the same activity, and one person can have multiple
purposes for participating in one activity.183 “Human motivations are ter-
ribly complex.”184 Given the vague standards, it is not surprising that the
IRS has attempted to create some automatic rules for certain classes of
cases. The artificial imposition of strict rules, however, can lead to inap-
propriate results.
The IRS has employed at least three different approaches for denying
IRC § 501(c)(3) status to nonprofits promoting sports for nonelite adult
athletes. The first approach focuses exclusively on the educational test;
the second approach disqualifies the organization because it has a sub-
stantial social or recreational purpose; and the third approach considers
whether the organization promotes national or international sports
competition.
The first approach is the IRS’s typical attack. In this approach, the IRS
evaluates whether the nonprofit promoting a sport is educational, and if it
fails the educational test, the IRS automatically denies IRC § 501(c)(3)
status. In a seminal ruling, Revenue Ruling 70-4, the nonprofit attempted
to revive a sport through multiple activities, including conducting tourna-
ments.185 Although the regulations define educational purposes broadly,
including the “instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of
improving or developing his capabilities,”186 the IRS stated in a con-
clusory manner that the organization’s activities “neither improve[d] nor
develop[ed] the capabilities of the individual.”187 The IRS concluded that
“these activities are not educational,” and as a result, “this organization is
not exempt . . . under [IRC § 501(c)(3)].”188
Revenue Ruling 70-4 reflects a myopic view of IRC § 501(c)(3) status
because an organization that is not educational could still qualify under
IRC § 501(c)(3) as a charitable organization or could qualify under an-
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1959) (stating that an organization must “en-
gage[ ] primarily in activities which accomplish one or more . . . exempt purposes”); HOP-
KINS, supra note 19, at 79 (“Whether an organization has a substantial nonexempt purpose
is a question of fact, to be resolved on the basis of all the appropriate evidence.”) (citing
Church by Mail, Inc. v. Comm’r, 765 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’g 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 471
(1984)); see also infra note 206.
182. See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 78 (“The operational test focuses on the actual
purposes the organization advances by means of its activities . . . .”).
183. See Copyright Clearance Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 793, 803 (1982); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 2010-31-035 (Aug. 6, 2010) (when multiple people participate, the government
considers the purposes of the participants generally); see also HOPKINS, supra note 19, at
79.
184. Colombo, supra note 26, at 669.
185. Rev. Rul. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126.
186. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959).
187. Rev. Rul. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126.
188. Id.
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other category.189 Revenue Ruling 70-4 vividly demonstrates the IRS’s
obsessive focus on the educational test because the IRS failed to address
whether the particular nonprofit was charitable as a result of promoting
health, even though the nonprofit stated that its purpose was to
“promot[e] the health of the general public by encouraging all persons to
improve their physical condition.”190
Similarly, in a 2008 ruling,191 the IRS considered an adult amateur soc-
cer team. The team played matches once a week, and player training con-
sisted of drills, conditioning, and teaching soccer plays. The IRS said the
drills and other activities “may help develop the soccer players’ skills,”192
but the IRS concluded that developing skills does not “develop the capa-
bilities of the individual” under the regulatory definition of the word edu-
cational.193 The IRS concluded that because the organization’s activities
were not educational, the organization failed to qualify under IRC
§ 501(c)(3).
The IRS’s strained reasoning in this area may have reached its zenith in
Revenue Ruling 78-98, which involved a school that operated a ski slope
and ski lift six miles from its main campus.194 The IRS ruled that recrea-
tional skiing on the slope by the school’s students was substantially re-
lated to the school’s educational purpose, but also concluded that skiing
by the general public was not related to an educational purpose. A tax
regime in which a college senior’s skiing is educational, but the next win-
ter, after graduation, her skiing on the same slope is not educational, is
suspect.
The Tax Court has suggested a more detailed approach for determining
when adult athletic training is educational under IRC § 501(c)(3). In
Syrang Aero Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered an
organization with one activity; it rented its one airplane at a low cost to its
thirty members to provide them with flying time.195 The Tax Court noted,
on the one hand, the members were increasing their skills by practicing
their flying and that “flight experience in itself is necessary to advance the
skill of an aviator.”196 But on the other hand, the Tax Court stated that
“[u]nsupervised flying time may actually result in acquiring and reinforc-
ing bad habits.”197 The Tax Court concluded this particular flying club did
not qualify because “to be educational, such [flying] time should be eval-
189. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1959) (stating that an organization must en-
gage in activities that accomplish “one or more of such exempt purposes specified in sec-
tion 501(c)(3)”); HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 152 (stating that the list of exempt purposes in
IRC § 501(c)(3) “is framed in the disjunctive . . . [which] evidences congressional intent to
accord tax exemption to any organization organized . . . for any one of the designated
purposes or functions”).
190. Rev. Rul. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126.
191. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-49-018 (Dec. 5, 2008).
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959).
194. Rev. Rul. 78-98, 1978-1 C.B. 167.
195. 73 T.C. 716 (1980).
196. Id. at 721.
197. Id.
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uated and criticized by a more experienced person who can direct the
member’s training so that the practice time will effect improvement.”198
Under the Tax Court’s method of analysis, the educational determination
could turn on whether an organization’s practices and competitions are
supervised by a coach, a manager, a personal trainer, or other similar
supervisor. An open question is how the Tax Court would decide if a
nonprofit’s players critiqued one another’s performances, analyzed their
own performances by watching video tapes, or reviewed statistics after
the practice or competition.
The conclusion that nonprofits promoting nonelite adult sports compe-
titions generally are not educational when there is no instruction, review,
or supervision likely is a sound position. While repetitive practice and
competition can develop skills and might lead to intellectual insights and
new understandings, in many situations it would be a stretch to say that
unsupervised athletic training or competition is an educational en-
deavor.199 As a practical matter, a person who is reading, studying, or
researching would normally view a tennis match or other sporting activity
as a respite from cerebral pursuits. The problem with the IRS’s approach
is the excessive fixation on whether sports organizations are educational,
and the IRS’s failure to consider whether these organizations are charita-
ble under IRC § 501(c)(3) because they promote health.200
A second approach that the IRS and the courts use to deny IRC
§ 501(c)(3) status to nonprofit adult sports organizations is to declare that
the organizations have a substantial recreational or social purpose.201 If
an organization has a single, substantial nonexempt purpose, it cannot
qualify under IRC § 501(c)(3).202 In a 2013 ruling,203 the nonprofit’s pri-
mary activity was the operation of a minor league, adult football team.
The team competed in a league with a ten-game season, and the team
practiced two days a week. The team also sponsored a weekly “players’
night out.”204 The IRS concluded that “[m]any of your players play for
the love of the sport, and community benefit if any is incidental to the
main purpose of playing on a team . . . .”205 Similarly, in Wayne Baseball,
Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court concluded that an organization spon-
soring an adult, amateur baseball team failed to qualify because it had a
substantial recreational or social purpose, referring to the “purpose of
198. Id. at 719.
199. See Nat’l All. v. United States, 710 F.2d 868, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, in dicta, that an activity must have intellectual
appeal and help in a learning process to be educational); see supra text accompanying note
150.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 185–88.
201. See, e.g., Wayne Baseball, Inc. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 437 (1999); Media
Sports League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1093 (1986); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,560 (Sept. 30, 1986).
202. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash. D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
203. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-13-033 (Mar. 29, 2013).
204. Id. The players night out gave the players an opportunity to spend time together.
See id.
205. Id.
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providing a team for the enjoyment, recreation, and social interaction of
the players.”206
Summarily concluding that the purpose of any sport is substantially
recreational has some intuitive appeal, but upon closer examination such
an approach should be fine-tuned. It is true that the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that an organization with a substantial, nonexempt purpose does
not qualify for IRC § 501(c)(3) status,207 and cases hold that a recrea-
tional or social purpose is a nonexempt purpose.208 Furthermore, the
word recreational is a broad term that can apply to all sports.209 Indeed,
sports may be viewed as a subset of the universe of recreational activities;
other recreational categories would include games, child’s play,210 diver-
sions, entertainments, and amusements.211
Nevertheless, treating all sports as recreation, and summarily denying
IRC § 501(c)(3) status to all nonprofits promoting sports, would be incon-
sistent with congressional guidance. IRC § 501(c)(3) includes, within the
list of eight exempt purposes, organizations that “foster national or inter-
national amateur sports competition.”212 In addition, in support of the
Revenue Act of 1950, Congress in the legislative history states that col-
lege football games are educational.213 Furthermore, the IRS consistently
has held that promoting sports competition among minors or college stu-
dents is educational and, therefore, exempt under IRC § 501(c)(3).214
A more detailed approach is appropriate. A court or the IRS should
carefully consider the significance of the nonprofit’s exempt purpose and
the significance of the social or recreational purposes separate and apart
from the sports promotion activities. For example, if the organization
206. 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 437 (1999); see also Media Sports League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 52
T.C.M. (CCH) 1093 (1986) (concluding that more than an insubstantial part of the non-
profit’s activities further the nonexempt social and recreational interests of its members).
207. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., 326 U.S. at 283 (1945).
208. See, e.g., St. Louis Sci. Fiction Ltd. v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126 (1985);
Minn. Kingsmen Chess Ass’n, Inc. v. Comm’r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1133 (1983).
209. See McKinney v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City, 308 S.W.2d 320, 325
(Mo. App. 1957) (“[R]ecreation in its popular sense . . . is of very comprehensive
signific[ance] and includes in its general meaning games, sports, and plays.”); Denmark v.
State, 954 P.2d 624, 626 (Colo. App. 1997) (defining the phrase recreational area to include
a place where an individual could play sports); RECREATION, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INT’L DICTIONARY 1899 (1993) (including the terms refreshment, diversion, play, amuse-
ment, and entertainment to define the word recreation).
210. Martinez v. Harris Cnty., 808 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. App. 1991) (concluding that
recreation includes playing on a swing).
211. See RECREATION, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1899 (1993) (includ-
ing the terms refreshment, diversion, play, amusement, and entertainment to define the
word recreation).
212. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2014).
213. S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 79 (1950), as reprinted in 1950 C.B. 559 (“Of course, in-
come of an educational organization from charges for admission to football games would
not be deemed to be income from an unrelated business, since its athletic activities are
substantially related to its educational program.”); 1950-2 C.B. 458 (House version).
214. See Rev. Rul. 77-365, 1977-2 C.B. 192; see also supra text accompanying note 10.
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hosts pool parties,215 players’ nights out,216 masquerade parties,217 or
other similar activities, those could be considered activities with a social
or recreational purpose. A court or the IRS should consider whether the
nonprofit’s social or recreational purposes are substantial when com-
pared to its exempt purposes such as educating, combatting juvenile de-
linquency, lessening the burdens of government, or promoting health.
Thus, a court or the IRS should not automatically treat sports training or
competition that promotes health as social or recreational when deciding
if the organization has a substantial nonexempt purpose.
The IRS’s third approach for denying IRC § 501(c)(3) status to organi-
zations promoting nonelite adult sports appears in a few rulings consider-
ing whether an organization is a qualified amateur sports organization as
described in IRC § 501(c)(3) and IRC § 501(j). In this category of exemp-
tion, Congress’s intent is not perfectly clear. In 1976, Congress added
nonprofits that “foster national or international amateur sports competi-
tion” and that do not provide athletic facilities or equipment, to the list of
enumerated exempt purposes under IRC § 501(c)(3).218 In the legislative
history, Congress expressed frustration with the IRS’s pre-1976 applica-
tion of the rules in this area,219 it emphasized that the change was not
intended to deny exempt status to any sports organizations previously
recognized as exempt under IRC § 501(c)(3), and it expressed a clear de-
sire for the IRS to grant IRC § 501(c)(3) status to certain organizations
promoting national or international sports.
In 1982, Congress liberalized these rules by removing, as a practical
matter, the restriction on providing the athletes with facilities or equip-
ment, clarifying that such an organization can qualify even if its member-
ship is merely “local or regional in nature,” and specifying that a
nonprofit can qualify if it is “organized and operated exclusively to foster
national or international amateur sports competition . . . or to support
and develop amateur athletes for national or international competition in
sports.”220 Earlier drafts of this legislation attempted to restrict this cate-
gory of exemption to organizations promoting the U.S. Olympic team or
the U.S. team for the Pan-American Games, or to organizations promot-
ing sports listed on the programs of the Olympics or the Pan-American
Games,221 but Congress ultimately rejected those restrictions.
When applying these rules, the IRS has focused on one Congressman’s
comments, made on the Senate floor in 1976, although those comments
do not appear in the statutes nor the House, Senate, or Joint Committee
215. See, e.g., St. Louis Science Fiction Ltd. v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126, 1127
(1985).
216. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-13-033 (Mar. 29, 2013).
217. See, e.g., St. Louis Science Fiction, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1127.
218. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1313(a) 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2014)).
219. See H.R. 10612, 94th Cong. at 423, 2d Sess. (1976); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 8.
220. I.R.C. § 501(j)(2) (2014).
221. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,459 (Dec. 26, 1985) (emphasis added).
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Reports. This one Senator, in explaining his understanding of the 1976
amendments, stated in part, “[This change] is not intended to make social
clubs or organizations of casual athletes into tax-exempt charities . . . or-
ganizations whose primary purpose is the recreation of their members or
whose facilities are used primarily by casual athletes will not qualify.”222
As noted, Congress effectively removed the restrictions on providing
equipment and facilities in 1982.223
The IRS interprets this category of exemption in a manner that likely
will promote only elite athletics. In a 2008 ruling, the IRS concluded that
a club of adult males conducting a moto tournament failed to qualify be-
cause its activities were merely local.224 In another 2008 ruling, the IRS
concluded that an adult soccer team occasionally scheduling games
against teams in another state did not qualify because those games were
not part of a national competition.225 In response to the nonprofit’s asser-
tion that it helped prepare players for college, professional, and Olympic
soccer, the IRS said there was no information that “its athletes are of a
caliber that makes them serious contenders [for the Olympics],” and
there was no “evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the
members will participate in national or international competition.”226 In
the same ruling, the IRS established a seven-factor test to help determine
whether a nonprofit fosters national or international competition.227 The
IRS stated these factors are “not solely determinative.”228 Nevertheless,
all seven factors suggest that this category of exemption is reserved for
organizations promoting elite athletics,229 particularly the factor consider-
ing whether the athletes are “of a caliber that makes them serious con-
tenders for the Olympic or Pan-American Games.”230
The IRS has held that this category of exemption is available to (i) an
organization recognized as the national governing body of a sport by the
U.S. Olympic Committee;231 (ii) an organization that provides a national
training center for developing Olympic athletes;232 and (iii) an organiza-
tion that sponsors a major post-season college football bowl game that
could influence the voting for major college football’s national champion
222. 122 CONG. REC. 25,961 (1976) (comments by Senator Culver) (emphasis added),
quoted in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,459 (Dec. 26, 1985).
223. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text (the restriction is stated in IRC
§ 501(c)(3), but IRC § 501(j) allows organizations that provide equipment or facilities to
qualify).
224. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-42-055 (Oct. 17, 2008).




229. Id. Other factors include (i) whether the sport involved is an Olympic or Pan-
American Games sport; (ii) whether the athletes are “in the age group from which
Olympic-quality athletes are usually chosen;” (iii) whether the organization provides daily
training; and (iv) whether the organization is “a member of the [U.S.] Olympic Commit-
tee.” Id.
230. Id.
231. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,459 (Dec. 26, 1985).
232. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,560 (Sept. 30, 1986).
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team.233
Based on the statutory language, this category of exemption should be
interpreted more broadly than under the IRS approach. National and in-
ternational sports competition should include senior events as well as the
Olympics and the Pan American Games. Organizations promoting senior
or other age-group adult national athletic competitions, or assisting the
competing athletes, should be eligible if they meet all the other statutory
criteria. Nevertheless, most nonelite adult athletes do not compete na-
tionally, so even if applied liberally, many nonprofit adult sports organi-
zations would need to qualify in a different category of IRC § 501(c)(3),
such as the promotion of health.
F. TRACING THE IRS’S FOCUS ON EDUCATION TO A BYGONE ERA
A body of case law rooted a century ago,234 when sports were primarily
for the young and the idle rich,235 and long before the modern medical
research linking inactivity to an epidemic of chronic diseases,236 helps ex-
plain the IRS’s tendency to evaluate sports nonprofits based solely on
whether they are educational. These cases also help explain why the IRS
tends to hold that all sports activities affiliated with colleges and other
schools are educational.
1. IRS Reliance in 1964 on a 1904 Case that Was Overruled in 1945
In a fascinating ruling, the IRS left clues that this old body of case law
has influenced its approach. In Revenue Ruling 64-275, the organization’s
charter provided that it “operated exclusively for educational pur-
poses.”237 Its specific purposes included furnishing training in racing
small sailboats “to improve the caliber of [U.S.] candidates . . . in the
Olympic and Pan-American Games and other international racing
events” and “[t]o provide practice racing sessions, classroom lectures,
seminars and panel discussions through which selected trainees may be
schooled in competitive helmsmanship, sail handling and racing tac-
tics.”238 Each summer, the organization annually hosted three symposi-
ums, each lasting three-to-five days, conducted by sailboat racing experts.
The symposiums included practice racing by the participants, post-
mortem reviews by the experts, demonstrations by the experts while the
participants watched “from launches in which a running commentary
[was] given by additional members of the staff,”239 classroom sessions,
233. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,775 (Feb. 6, 1989).
234. See generally Kesserling v. Bonneycastle Club, Inc., 186 S.W.2d 402, 404–05 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1945) (citing 95 A.L.R. 62 (1935)).
235. See Eva Jacobs & Stephanie Shipp, How Family Spending Has Changed in the
U.S., MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Mar. 1990, at 20, 27 (“Increasing free time and incomes
[in the early 1920s] meant that families had more time for sports, once the exclusive prov-
ince of the ‘idle rich.’”).
236. See supra notes 60–70 and accompanying text.
237. Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-2 C.B. 142, 143.
238. Id.
239. Id.
498 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
and panel discussions in the evenings.240 In addition, the organization
“assist[ed] the United States Olympic Association in the selection of
boats and sailing teams to represent the United States in the Olympic and
Pan-American Games.”241 “Over 1000 persons have attended the
symposiums and lectures and the activities have not been limited to a
privileged few.”242
As a preliminary matter, if the IRS had evaluated the organization af-
ter 1982, it could have concluded that the organization qualified under
IRC § 501(c)(3) and § 501(j) as a qualified amateur sports organization
because the organization supported elite athletes capable of competing
for the U.S. in the Olympics or the Pan-American Games.243 However, in
1964, the IRS considered whether the organization qualified under IRC
§ 501(c)(3) as educational and chose to begin its substantive analysis by
stating, “In the area of judicial construction, the courts have consistently
held that training in athletics and physical fitness is ‘educational.’”244 As
authority for this broad statement, the IRS cited a 1904 Kentucky case
that was overruled in 1948.245 The IRS also cited a 1927 Washington D.C.
case246 that relied heavily on the overruled 1904 Kentucky case.
In the 1904 Kentucky case, a nonprofit named German Gymnastics As-
sociation owned and operated a gymnasium and desired to qualify for a
real property tax exemption on the basis that it was an educational insti-
tution under Kentucky law.247 The organization regularly employed a
teacher who instructed its members in gymnastics classes.248 The case
does not indicate the age of the members or whether the nonprofit had
any connection with a school. Nevertheless, in deciding whether the non-
profit was an educational institution, the Kentucky court made an impor-
tant pivot that linked sports, education, and schools. The court stated that
education involves three areas, namely the cultivation of the mind, the
improvement of religious or moral sentiments, and the “development of
one’s physical faculties.”249 The court’s support for including all three
fields within the term educational was that “[t]hose in charge of colleges
and institutions of learning recognize this to be true,” and colleges main-
tain gymnasiums and encourage “football and other athletic sports.”250
Thus, the 1904 Kentucky court’s rationale appears to be that if colleges
do it, it must be educational. The Kentucky court stated that an institu-
240. The organization also sponsors three winter symposiums featuring lectures and
panel discussions regarding racing techniques, rules, and boating safety. Id.
241. Id. at 144.
242. Id. at 145.
243. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(j)(2) (2014); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,560 (Sept. 30,
1986).
244. Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-2 C.B. 142, 145.
245. German Gymnastics Ass’n v. Louisville, 80 S.W. 201 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904), over-
ruled by 209 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948).
246. Comm’rs of D.C. v. Shannon & Luchs Const. Co., 17 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
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tion that cultivates all three—the mind, religious sentiments, and physical
development—provides the “perfect education,” but stated that any insti-
tution that develops any one of the three is educational.251 In demonstrat-
ing the consequences of this proposition, the Kentucky court stated, “[i]f
three institutions are organized–one seeking by a course of instruction to
cultivate the mind, one by a method of instruction to improve students’
religious or moral conditions, and another to teach physical culture to
produce a better physical development, each is an institution of educa-
tion, as much as the one at which the student can acquire the threefold
knowledge.”252
In Revenue Ruling 64-275, the IRS also cited the Commissioners of
D.C. v. Shannon & Luchs Construction Co., Inc. case.253 This 1927 opin-
ion discussed German Gymnastics at length and adopted the 1904 Ger-
man Gymnastics proposition that physical development is part of the
perfect education.254 The court in Commissioners of D.C. concluded that
an athletic field for Western High School qualified as an educational insti-
tution under a zoning ordinance.255
It is puzzling that in 1964 the IRS chose to rely on German Gymnastics
and Commissioners of D.C. because the Kentucky Court of Appeals
overruled German Gymnastics in 1945.256  In a rejection of the three-part
perfect education proposition in German Gymnastics, in 1945, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals concluded that if an institution’s athletic activities
greatly exceed its mental activities, the organization is not an educational
institution.257 In 1948, the Kentucky Court of Appeals specifically re-
viewed the property tax exemption of the German Gymnastics Associa-
tion, overruled its 1904 conclusion, and held that the German Gymnastics
Association was not an educational institution and must pay property tax.
In a clear denial of the 1904 analysis, the court specifically noted that
there were “no material changes in the [German Gymnastics] Associa-
tion’s methods of operation since 1904.”258
2. Questionable Factual Foundation of the 1904 Case Relied on by IRS
In addition, the IRS’s reliance on German Gymnastics is puzzling be-
cause the case’s factual basis is questionable. The court in the 1904 Ger-
man Gymnastics opinion states that education consists of the
251. Id.
252. Id. (emphasis added); see also Louisville Coll. of Pharm. v. City of Louisville, 82
S.W. 610, 612 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904) (quoting German Gymnastics for the principle that the
perfect education cultivates the mind, morals, and physical culture).
253. 17 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
254. Id. at 221.
255. Id. at 220 (“An educational institution consists, not only of the buildings, but of all
the grounds necessary for the accomplishment of the full scope of educational
instruction.”).
256. Kesserling v. Bonnycastle Club, Inc., 186 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945).
257. Id.; see also State v. Rowan, 106 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1937) (stating that “[w]e
do not feel justified . . . in holding than an institution devoted chiefly to physical education
is such an institution as may be exempted from taxation”).
258. German Gymnastic Ass’n v. Louisville, 209 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948).
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development of one’s physical faculties because “[t]hose in charge of col-
leges and institutions of learning recognize this to be true . . . and a gym-
nasium is maintained and football and other athletic sports are
encouraged.”259
The implication that all chancellors, presidents, provosts, and others in
charge of colleges and universities have always unanimously supported all
sports on campus is inaccurate. A historian writes that as early as the
1880s, “Some of the [college] presidents wanted to ban athletics, or at
least football, or reform them . . . .”260 After nineteen young men died
playing football in 1905, a reporter described playing football as partici-
pating in a “death harvest.”261 The President of Harvard University and
other college officials tried to “abolish [football] altogether” in the early
1900s.262 In his book, The Big Scrum: How Teddy Roosevelt Saved Foot-
ball, John J. Miller describes President Roosevelt calling a meeting of
college presidents at the White House in the Fall of 1905 to force rule
changes.263 The primary reason for creating the predecessor of the
NCAA in 1905-1906 was to address violence in football.264 A former
president of the University of Chicago stated that it would make as much
sense for a college to have a race horse as it would to have a football
team.265 As discussed in Part II.D of this Article, grave concerns about
the appropriateness of college football continue, particularly because of
medical findings regarding concussions.266
Also, many leaders of European colleges and universities apparently
do not view physical development as a key part of school. “Americans
devote [much] time, effort and money to the business of college sports,
[when] the rest of the world barely bats an eye.”267 In Europe, opportuni-
ties for college athletes are “few and far between.”268 Even though soccer
is Europe’s most popular sport, and soccer is not a major sport in the
259. German Gymnastics, 80 S.W. at 201.
260. RONALD A. SMITH, PAY FOR PLAY: A HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE ATHLETIC
REFORM 39 (2011).
261. See Michael Beschloss, How a Son Inspired a President to Help Rescue a Sport,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014, at D5 (stating that “[t]he Chicago Tribune reported that
[nineteen] people died playing college, high school and sandlot football [in 1905]”);
Milhoces, supra note 163, at 3C (referring to the “death harvest” quote in an article).
262. Beschloss, supra note 261, at D5.
263. JOHN J. MILLER, THE BIG SCRUM: HOW TEDDY ROOSEVELT SAVED FOOTBALL
(2011) (Harper Publishing); Beschloss, supra note 261, at D5.
264. Mihoces, supra note 163, at 3C.
265. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT
IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 3 (2001) (“A college racing stable makes as much sense as
college football. The jockey could carry the college colors; the students could cheer; the
alumni could bet; and the horse wouldn’t have to pass a history test.”) (quoting Robert
Hutchins).
266. See, e.g., Will, supra note 9, at 11; Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2011, at 80; CARROL & ROSNER, supra note 152, at xii; see also
supra notes 157–65 and accompanying text.
267. Kathryn Burkholder, Why Us? College Sports and the American Experience,
RUTGERS http://amerstudies.rutgers.edu/archieves/98-why-us-college-sports-and-the-amer-
ican-experience (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
268. Id.
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U.S.,269 students who want to pursue both a college education and com-
petitive soccer leave Europe and enroll in U.S. universities. A nineteen-
year-old who spent two years at a college in England and moved to the
U.S. for both a college education and greater soccer opportunities said,
“College in England serves the purpose of ‘education only.’”270 Euro-
pean college teams typically train only once or twice a week, compete
only once a month, and the players “pay sizeable fee[s] . . . to cover ex-
penses, with no athletic scholarships.”271
3. Rich Judicial History Reflects Various Positive Impacts of Sports
Although the IRS chose to focus on an overruled case, founded on a
dubious factual basis, and continues to obsess over whether sports activi-
ties are educational, a more thorough analysis of older U.S. cases reveals
a rich judicial appreciation for the many positive societal influences of
sports and physical activities.
A series of cases conclude that because grade school and high school
students may spend almost half of their waking time, five days a week,
nine months a year, in the custody of a school, physical or athletic activity
is a necessary part of a school’s activities.272 For example, the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that recreational grounds and athletic fields are neces-
sities for the proper development of grade school children.273  Another
court observed that the recreational facilities, as well as the food produc-
tion and preparation areas used to provide nourishment to students, were
all parts of the educational institution and entitled to a property tax ex-
269. See Zach Beauchamp, MAP: The Most Popular Sport in Every Country, VOX,
(July 3, 2014; 2:43PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/3/5868115/most-popular-sports-world-
cup (“In virtually all of Europe . . . soccer is king.”); Daniel Cox, Is Soccer Destined to
Become America’s National Pastime?, HUFFINGTON POST, (Feb. 8, 2014; 5:59 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-cox/soccer-in-america_b_4740668.html (“[T]he idea that
soccer could compete for the honor of American’s most popular sport seems preposterous
on its face.”).
270. Burkholder, supra note 267 (quoting Chris Moore, who attended East Durham &
Hougall Community College in his native Newcastle, England, and moved to the U.S. to
attend Rutgers University); see also Stefanie Loh, Club Sports is King In Europe, But
There Are Downsides to That System Too, THE PATRIOT-NEWS, (Apr. 24, 2011, 10:54 AM),
http://blog.pennlive.com/patriotnewssports//print.html?entry=/2011/04/
club_sports_is_king_in_europe.html (regarding Oli Templeton from Manchester, England
who “realized he could play soccer and go to school simultaneously” in the U.S. and is
attending Shippensburg University in Pennsylvania).
271. Burkholder, supra note 267; see also Loh, supra note 270.
272. See McNair v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Cascade Cnty., 288 P. 188, 190 (Mont. 1930). In
addition, a 1927 Arizona case observed that the length of the school day had to increase
because initially “school taught only the Three R’s,” but as the world progressed, students
needed to be trained in all fields. Alexander v. Phillips, 254 P. 1056, 1058 (Ariz. 1927).
273. Reiger v. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.E. 838, 839 (Ill. 1919); see also Burlington ex rel. Bd.
of Sch. Comm’rs v. Burlington, 127 A. 892, 897 (Vt. 1925) (describing physical training as a
necessity at secondary schools); State ex rel. Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct. of Chelan Cnty., 124 P.
484, 486 (Wash. 1912) (approving a school’s appropriation of additional land for use as a
playground on which the students can play athletic games).
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emption.274 Two courts have indicated that the ancient Greek philoso-
phers and their students believed that physical activity was necessary for
sustained mental activity. During “[t]he intervals of running, wrestling,
and the like, the Greek youths [spoke] to philosophers who had come to
watch the games, on the ‘good, the beautiful, and the true.’”275
Perhaps this ancient Greek approach is appropriate for adults today.
Many U.S. office workers spend half their waking hours on weekdays in
intellectual pursuits with relatively little physical activity.276 Perhaps con-
sistent with the practices of the ancient Greek civilization, the U.S.
should encourage the integration of physical activity with mental activity.
A series of older cases granted tax exemption, or other favored status,
to athletic activities and facilities because they promoted health. In a case
involving Our Lady of Angels Seminary in New York, the court stated,
“Suitable recreation and physical exercise are deemed requisite to health
and successful mental culture. The means and opportunity for that pur-
pose may therefore properly be provided upon the premises of a literary
institution for its students.”277 In a wide-ranging opinion, the Montana
Supreme Court approved the construction of a gymnasium and athletic
field in part because it would promote physical well-being.278 In support,
the court noted that the English schools promoted “physical vigor.”279
An Arizona court observed “athletic games under proper supervision
tend to the proper development of the body [and that] is a self-evident
fact.”280
Other, older cases endorse diverse rationales for approving tax exemp-
tions of nonprofit sports organizations. One court concluded that the gov-
ernment needed to promote sports and physical activities because of the
shift from a rural to an urban society. “When eighty to ninety percent of
our population was composed of farmers, it was universally thought the
growing generation found . . . physical training in the manifold duties of
the home.”281 With the great shift of half the population to urban areas,
there was “little or no chance for physical training for children in the
home.”282
274. State ex rel. Our Lady of Angels v. Baden, 3 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 367, 370 (N.Y. Gen.
Term 1886) (cited in German Gymnastics Ass’n v. Louisville, 80 S.W. 201, 201 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1904)) .
275. McNair, 288 P. at 191 (Mont. 1930); see also Dodge v. Jefferson, 181 S.W.2d 406
(Ky. Ct. App. 1944) (also endorsing a Greek view of mixing athletics and mental training).
276. See supra notes 91–102 and accompanying text.
277. Our Lady of Angels, 3 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 370; see also Comm’rs of D.C. v. Shannon
& Luchs Const. Co., Inc., 17 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (“Suitable recreation and physi-
cal exercise are deemed requisite to health and successful mental culture.”); State ex rel.
Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct. of Chelan Cnty., 124 P. 484, 486 (Wash. 1912) (“The physical devel-
opment of a child is as essential to his well being as is his mental development . . . .”).
278. McNair, 288 P. at 190.
279. Id. at 191.
280. Alexander v. Phillips, 254 P. 1056, 1057 (Ariz. 1927).
281. Id. at 1058.
282. Id.
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Another rationale was that sports and physical activity provided proper
values for good citizenship. As an example, one court extolled the virtues
of football players.
[T]he boy who makes a successful football player must necessarily
learn self-control under the most trying circumstances, courage, both
physical and moral, in the face of strong opposition, sacrifice of indi-
vidual ease for a community purpose, teamwork to the exclusion of
individual glorification, and above all that “die in the last ditch”
spirit which leads a man to do for a cause everything that is reasona-
bly possible, and when that is done, to achieve the impossible by
sheer will-power. The same is true to a greater or lesser degree of
practically every athletic sport which is exhibited in a stadium.283
President Theodore Roosevelt once described football as the “greatest
exercise of the fine moral qualities, such as resolution, courage, endur-
ance, and capacity to hold one’s own and stand up under punishment.”284
Combat preparation for World Wars is another judicially approved ra-
tionale for the “impetus [for] greater attention to physical training as a
legitimate function of education.”285
III. CONCLUSION: REFORMING THE SPORTS WORLD
BASED ON MEDICAL EVIDENCE
Medical research demonstrates that inactivity is associated with the
modern epidemic of chronic diseases. Nevertheless, the courts and the
IRS cling to approaches developed in a bygone era and consistently ig-
nore claims that sports promote health. The IRS’s outmoded approach
relies on a doctrine dating back to 1904 from a Kentucky case that was
overruled in 1948.286
Adopting this Article’s proposal could encourage major shifts in the
U.S. approach to sports; from an excessive emphasis on youth, college,
and elite sports, to encouraging everyone to compete; from huge numbers
of spectators and few players, to greater participation; and from an em-
phasis on violent collision sports, to a more diverse sports scene. This
proposal could inspire the development of U.S. sports organizations that
would share key features found in European sports clubs. Everyone could
be eligible to participate in age-group categories, with people remaining
athletic for life, and with reasonable participants’ fees financing the orga-
nizations.287 Germany often provides direct government subsidies to ath-
letic clubs promoting both youth and adult athletics.288 With a population
of eighty-four million, Germany has twenty-four million people regis-
283. Id. at 1059.
284. Beschloss, supra note 261, at D5.
285. McNair v. Sch. Dist., 288 P. 188, 191 (Mont. 1930); see also Dodge v. Jefferson, 181
S.W.2d 406, 408 (Ky. 1944).
286. See supra notes 253–58 and accompanying text.
287. See Loh, supra note 270.
288. Id. (reporting that “these clubs offer competition for people of all ages including
adults in a variety of different sports”).
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tered with sports clubs.289 A German professor of sports studies com-
mented, “There’s much more sports for adults than over [in America],
and it’s cheaper.”290 The U.S. tax system should help reform the U.S.
sports world to combat the modern epidemic of chronic diseases.
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting Professor Annette Hofmann, Professor of Sports Studies at the
Ludwigsburg University of Education in Germany).
